Harrow Council’s latest draft accounts should be read as more than a set of financial figures. They expose an uncomfortable connection that Harrow Monitoring Group has repeatedly highlighted: weak services, weak governance and financial pressure can be different symptoms of the same problem.
The human consequences come first. Children’s Services were rated “Inadequate” by Ofsted, with Harrow’s own Annual Governance Statement identifying Children’s Social Care as a significant governance issue, particularly in relation to care leavers and leadership oversight. Forvis Mazars also concluded that the Ofsted findings represented a significant weakness in the Council’s value-for-money arrangements. Adult Social Care was rated “Requires Improvement” by the CQC, with weaknesses identified in waiting times, safeguarding awareness and support for carers. The Council reports subsequent improvement in both areas, but they remain important evidence of services that had not been operating as they should.
Harrow Monitoring Group’s previous research has raised related concerns about safeguarding assurance, accessibility of the Local Authority Designated Officer (LADO) pathway, the effectiveness and visibility of independent scrutiny, leadership instability and whether governance arrangements provide sufficient assurance that vulnerable children are being protected. Housing provides another warning sign, with concerns about repairs, damp and mould, boiler failures, complaints and the mounting cost of temporary accommodation.
These weaknesses do not affect only service users. Failure can cost taxpayers money. Poor early intervention can allow problems to escalate into expensive statutory intervention. Weak placement planning can increase reliance on costly provision. Delayed adult social-care intervention can intensify needs, while ineffective housing management can generate repeat repairs, complaints and additional pressures. Leadership instability, agency staffing, consultants and remedial improvement programmes can create further costs.
The draft accounts put the financial pressures into perspective. Children’s Services overspent by £5.471 million, Adult Social Care and Public Health by £4.393 million, Culture, Environment and Economy by £2.998 million, and Housing and Regeneration by £2.430 million. Directorate overspends therefore totalled £12.628 million, although corporate budget underspends meant the Council overall remained within its £215.256 million revenue budget and transferred £3.001 million to reserves. Against this wider financial backdrop, short-term borrowing increased from approximately £3.3 million to £28.6 million, while long-term borrowing rose from approximately £412.8 million to £430.7 million. Combined, borrowing increased by around £43 million in one year.
Other London councils face many of the same demand and cost pressures. The important question for Harrow, therefore, is how much of this additional cost reflects unavoidable demand, and how much represents the financial price of weaknesses in management, early intervention, commissioning, safeguarding and service delivery?
Meanwhile, the cumulative Dedicated Schools Grant deficit has reached £28.736 million, with the Council identifying rising SEND demand and high-cost placements as significant pressures.
What is also striking is the apparent absence of any clear public statement from Harrow’s political or senior officer leadership accepting responsibility for the overall position created by these documented service and governance weaknesses. Improvement plans, explanations and assurances are necessary, but they are not the same as accountability. Where weaknesses persist in services consuming substantial public resources, residents are entitled to know what went wrong, whether those weaknesses generated avoidable costs, why existing management and governance arrangements failed to prevent them, and who ultimately accepts responsibility for putting matters right.
There is also a wider question about Harrow’s corporate culture. The Council can sometimes appear strongly compliance-driven, with considerable emphasis on governance processes, statutory procedures, assurance and demonstrating that formal requirements have been met. In such an environment, the role of the Strategic Director of Legal and Governance and the Council’s Monitoring Officer inevitably assumes considerable significance.
Compliance is essential, but compliance is not the same as effective service delivery. A council can have policies, procedures, boards, scrutiny arrangements and assurance mechanisms in place while residents still experience poor outcomes. The real test of governance must be whether those arrangements prevent failure, expose weaknesses early and produce demonstrably better services and value for public money.
Interestingly, the Council itself says that its Corporate Leadership Team manages service delivery and improvements and reviews the Council’s effectiveness in providing value-for-money services. Its accounts state that the Council’s priorities are directed by the political leadership and implemented by the Corporate Leadership Team.
The senior remuneration figures provide further context. Managing Director Alex Dewsnap received a salary of £188,817, with an employer pension contribution of £22,186, producing total remuneration of £211,003. Jessica Farmer, Strategic Director of Legal and Governance, received £156,739, with an employer pension contribution of £36,834, producing total remuneration of £193,573.
The closeness of their total remuneration is striking: the difference is just £17,430, around 8 per cent of the Managing Director’s total remuneration. Remuneration alone tells us nothing about individual performance, nor does it establish that the Council places excessive weight on legal and governance functions. But it does reinforce a legitimate question about the corporate structure: is Harrow achieving the right balance between governance and compliance at the centre and leadership focused relentlessly on measurable improvement in frontline services?
That question is particularly relevant because the Council itself says that the purpose of its Statement of Accounts includes giving stakeholders confidence that public money has been used to provide “value for money services”.
These remain draft, unaudited accounts, and figures may change following external audit. Harrow Monitoring Group is not carrying out an audit and is not suggesting that any expenditure is unlawful or incorrectly stated.
But the wider accountability question cannot be avoided. Ultimate corporate grip cannot rest simply with the Finance Portfolio Holder, or with individual assurance mechanisms such as the Independent Reviewing Officer, Independent Scrutineer or Monitoring Officer operating within the wider system. Harrow’s own accounts say political direction comes from the Council’s leadership while the Corporate Leadership Team provides managerial leadership and manages service delivery. Significantly, the Annual Governance Statement itself is signed on behalf of the Council by the Leader and Managing Director.
When serious weaknesses in essential services coexist with substantial financial pressures, residents are entitled to ask not simply what went wrong, but what it has cost them, whether some of that cost was avoidable, and who at the top accepts responsibility for putting it right.
The human consequences come first. Children’s Services were rated “Inadequate” by Ofsted, with Harrow’s own Annual Governance Statement identifying Children’s Social Care as a significant governance issue, particularly in relation to care leavers and leadership oversight. Forvis Mazars also concluded that the Ofsted findings represented a significant weakness in the Council’s value-for-money arrangements. Adult Social Care was rated “Requires Improvement” by the CQC, with weaknesses identified in waiting times, safeguarding awareness and support for carers. The Council reports subsequent improvement in both areas, but they remain important evidence of services that had not been operating as they should.
Harrow Monitoring Group’s previous research has raised related concerns about safeguarding assurance, accessibility of the Local Authority Designated Officer (LADO) pathway, the effectiveness and visibility of independent scrutiny, leadership instability and whether governance arrangements provide sufficient assurance that vulnerable children are being protected. Housing provides another warning sign, with concerns about repairs, damp and mould, boiler failures, complaints and the mounting cost of temporary accommodation.
These weaknesses do not affect only service users. Failure can cost taxpayers money. Poor early intervention can allow problems to escalate into expensive statutory intervention. Weak placement planning can increase reliance on costly provision. Delayed adult social-care intervention can intensify needs, while ineffective housing management can generate repeat repairs, complaints and additional pressures. Leadership instability, agency staffing, consultants and remedial improvement programmes can create further costs.
The draft accounts put the financial pressures into perspective. Children’s Services overspent by £5.471 million, Adult Social Care and Public Health by £4.393 million, Culture, Environment and Economy by £2.998 million, and Housing and Regeneration by £2.430 million. Directorate overspends therefore totalled £12.628 million, although corporate budget underspends meant the Council overall remained within its £215.256 million revenue budget and transferred £3.001 million to reserves. Against this wider financial backdrop, short-term borrowing increased from approximately £3.3 million to £28.6 million, while long-term borrowing rose from approximately £412.8 million to £430.7 million. Combined, borrowing increased by around £43 million in one year.
Other London councils face many of the same demand and cost pressures. The important question for Harrow, therefore, is how much of this additional cost reflects unavoidable demand, and how much represents the financial price of weaknesses in management, early intervention, commissioning, safeguarding and service delivery?
Meanwhile, the cumulative Dedicated Schools Grant deficit has reached £28.736 million, with the Council identifying rising SEND demand and high-cost placements as significant pressures.
What is also striking is the apparent absence of any clear public statement from Harrow’s political or senior officer leadership accepting responsibility for the overall position created by these documented service and governance weaknesses. Improvement plans, explanations and assurances are necessary, but they are not the same as accountability. Where weaknesses persist in services consuming substantial public resources, residents are entitled to know what went wrong, whether those weaknesses generated avoidable costs, why existing management and governance arrangements failed to prevent them, and who ultimately accepts responsibility for putting matters right.
There is also a wider question about Harrow’s corporate culture. The Council can sometimes appear strongly compliance-driven, with considerable emphasis on governance processes, statutory procedures, assurance and demonstrating that formal requirements have been met. In such an environment, the role of the Strategic Director of Legal and Governance and the Council’s Monitoring Officer inevitably assumes considerable significance.
Compliance is essential, but compliance is not the same as effective service delivery. A council can have policies, procedures, boards, scrutiny arrangements and assurance mechanisms in place while residents still experience poor outcomes. The real test of governance must be whether those arrangements prevent failure, expose weaknesses early and produce demonstrably better services and value for public money.
Interestingly, the Council itself says that its Corporate Leadership Team manages service delivery and improvements and reviews the Council’s effectiveness in providing value-for-money services. Its accounts state that the Council’s priorities are directed by the political leadership and implemented by the Corporate Leadership Team.
The senior remuneration figures provide further context. Managing Director Alex Dewsnap received a salary of £188,817, with an employer pension contribution of £22,186, producing total remuneration of £211,003. Jessica Farmer, Strategic Director of Legal and Governance, received £156,739, with an employer pension contribution of £36,834, producing total remuneration of £193,573.
The closeness of their total remuneration is striking: the difference is just £17,430, around 8 per cent of the Managing Director’s total remuneration. Remuneration alone tells us nothing about individual performance, nor does it establish that the Council places excessive weight on legal and governance functions. But it does reinforce a legitimate question about the corporate structure: is Harrow achieving the right balance between governance and compliance at the centre and leadership focused relentlessly on measurable improvement in frontline services?
That question is particularly relevant because the Council itself says that the purpose of its Statement of Accounts includes giving stakeholders confidence that public money has been used to provide “value for money services”.
These remain draft, unaudited accounts, and figures may change following external audit. Harrow Monitoring Group is not carrying out an audit and is not suggesting that any expenditure is unlawful or incorrectly stated.
But the wider accountability question cannot be avoided. Ultimate corporate grip cannot rest simply with the Finance Portfolio Holder, or with individual assurance mechanisms such as the Independent Reviewing Officer, Independent Scrutineer or Monitoring Officer operating within the wider system. Harrow’s own accounts say political direction comes from the Council’s leadership while the Corporate Leadership Team provides managerial leadership and manages service delivery. Significantly, the Annual Governance Statement itself is signed on behalf of the Council by the Leader and Managing Director.
When serious weaknesses in essential services coexist with substantial financial pressures, residents are entitled to ask not simply what went wrong, but what it has cost them, whether some of that cost was avoidable, and who at the top accepts responsibility for putting it right.